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JUSTICE V. HOSEMANN: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S DEVALUATION
OF STATE BALLOT INITIATIVES AND POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION
Kevin Bandy*
"[T]he principle on which this country was founded... is that direct
participationin political activity is what makes afree society. ,1
I. INTRODUCTION
The 2012 presidential election cycle set records. The race between
President Barack Obama and Governor Mitt Romney was the first
billion-dollar campaign, as each candidate raised $1.123 billion and
$1.019 billion, respectively.2 This was the first Watergate era campaign
in which both candidates turned down public funding, with the President
relying on a large number of small donations and the Governor relying
on a smaller number of large donations.3
As staggering as these numbers are, the race to support and oppose
state ballot initiatives in the 2012 election cycle was just as expensive.
Over the course of eighteen months, more than $1 billion was spent on
ballot initiative campaigns in eleven states-the most that has ever been
spent in an election cycle. 4 The ballot initiative spending, largely
occurring in West Coast states like California and Washington, came
from corporations and wealthy individuals alike.5
In an attempt to rein in campaign spending, and in light of recent
United States Supreme Court cases striking down disclosure and
campaign spending limit laws as applied to individual candidates, 6 states
have passed strict disclosure and registration laws for groups wishing to
support or oppose ballot initiatives. Individuals and groups alike have
* University of Cincinnati Law Review, Associate Member, 2014-15; Publications Editor, 2015-16.
The author would like to thank his parents, Jerry and Kay, for always showing him the importance of
voting. The author would also like to thank Professor Ronna Schneider for helping him cultivate his
love and of interest in the First Amendment.
1. MAXWELL TAYLOR KENNEDY, MAKE GENTLE THE LIFE OF THIS WORLD 12 (1998).
2. Kenneth Vogel et al., Barack Obama, Mitt Romney topped $1 billion in 2012, WASH. POST
(Dec. 7, 2012, 5:05 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/barack-obama-mitt-romney-bothtopped- l-billion-in-2012-84737.html.
3. Id.
4. Reid Wilson, Initiative spending booms past $1 billion as corporations sponsor their own
proposal,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
8,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/11/08/initiative-spending-booms-past-lbillion-as-corporations-sponsor-their-own-proposals/
5. Id.
6. See infra Part II of this Casenote for further discussion of these cases.
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challenged these laws as a violation of their First Amendment rights to
political expression and association, with mixed results. The Supreme
Court, silent on the constitutionality of laws restricting participation in
the ballot initiative process, has continuously struck down laws designed
to limit donations to individual candidates in the name of free speech
and political expression.
Part II of this Casenote examines past Supreme Court decisions
involving the First Amendment and campaign finance laws. It also
assesses the current circuit split between the Tenth and Fifth Circuit
Courts of Appeals, as those courts have struck down and upheld,
respectively, strict registration and disclosure laws for political
committees supporting and opposing ballot initiatives. Part III of this
Casenote analyzes these decisions and argues that the Supreme Court
erred in refusing to apply strict scrutiny to disclosure and group
registration laws, and that strict scrutiny is especially needed in the
ballot initiative process. Part III also discusses the public policy issues
behind limiting access and participation in the ballot initiative processa process originally designed to bring state politics closer to the people.
Part IV criticizes the Supreme Court's refusal to grant certiorari in
Justice v. Hosemann and the Court's failure to take an opportunity to
side with the Tenth Circuit in applying strict scrutiny and striking down
strict regulations on registration and disclosure laws in the context of
ballot initiatives.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The FirstAmendment and Campaign DisclosureLaws
The connection between the First Amendment and campaign
disclosure laws is an intricate web of competing interests and
complicated statutory schemes. This Casenote will focus on past
Supreme Court decisions that directly implicate the interests involved in
justifying disclosure laws as they could be applied to ballot initiatives.
1. Strict Scrutiny and Exacting Scrutiny in Campaign Finance Laws
Campaign finance laws that burden the First Amendment rights of
those wishing to contribute to a campaign have traditionally been
subject to one of two levels of scrutiny-exacting scrutiny or strict
scrutiny. The type of scrutiny refers to the level of review applied by a
court to a specific law when determining whether the law is
constitutional. Both of these tests require more than a "mere showing of
some legitimate governmental interest" and are difficult for the
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government to satisfy.7
Governments will sometimes pass laws that limit political expression
by preventing or discouraging a citizen from engaging in a certain type
of speech or activity. Examples of such laws are those that limit
individual donations to a particular candidate, require disclosure of
contributions and expenditures in a campaign, or prevent contributions
to certain kinds of campaigns, such as one for a state judge. Laws
limiting political expression are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires
the government to prove that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental interest. 8 In campaign finance law, there are a
limited number of interests that satisfy this test.9
Application of strict scrutiny review is reserved for situations in
which a fundamental right, such as free speech, the right to a jury trial,
or the right to privacy, is burdened by the government. The Supreme
Court, without much discussion or justification, has refused to place
participation in an initiative campaign on equal footing with these rights.
Laws which burden rights that are not considered fundamental will be
subject to either heightened scrutiny, discussed below, or rational basis
testing. 10
Disclosure requirement laws require citizens that donate to a
particular candidate or political committee to report to the government
how much they contribute and how often they are spending money.
Disclosure requirements in the context of political committees require
the committee to report things such as monthly financial statements,
identities of donors, and statements of purpose. Disclosure requirements
are subject to exacting scrutiny.11 This level of scrutiny requires that
there be a substantial relationship between the disclosure laws and the
purported governmental interest. 2 This governmental interest must be
sufficiently important.1 3 It is easier for the government to meet the
sufficiently important prong of the exacting scrutiny standard than it is
to meet the compelling interest prong of the strict scrutiny standard.

7. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).
8. Citizens United v, Fed. Elections Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
9. The interests in campaign finance law which qualify as compelling under strict scrutiny will
be considered in the discussion of Buckley and Citizens United.
10. Rational basis testing requires a law to be rationally related towards furthering a legitimate
governmental interest. It is the easiest level of scrutiny for a government to satisfy.
11. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366-67.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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2. Supreme Court Case Law Leading to the Current Circuit Split on
Ballot Initiative Disclosure Laws
The Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo 14 is a landmark
case that acknowledged the government's ability to limit campaign
donations and require disclosure of contributions.1 5 In Buckley, the
Supreme Court espoused three interests that justified the restriction on
campaign donations-the informational interest, anti-corruption interest,
and compliance interest. 16 The informational interest means that the
government may provide the voters with information about where
donations come from and how the candidate chooses to spend the
money, which allows the voters to assess a candidate for office.17 The
anti-corruption interest means that the government may deter corruption
and the appearance of corruption by exposing contributions and
expenditures. 18 Finally, the compliance interest allows the government
to ensure compliance with the contribution limits espoused elsewhere in
the Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA). 19 In light of these
interests, the Court upheld the disclosure requirements of FECA as
constitutional and consistent with the First Amendment.2 °
Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission21 may be best
known for its controversial holding extending First Amendment speech
rights to corporations.2 2 But in another part of the decision, the Court
sharply limited the anti-corruption rationale espoused in Buckley in
striking down as unconstitutional several provisions of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002. It did not discuss in detail the
informational interest. The law at issue prohibited corporations and
labor unions "from using their general treasury funds to make
independent expenditures for speech defined as an 'electioneering
communication."' 23 This specific provision had already been upheld by

14. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). These requirements were set out in the Federal Elections Campaign Act
of 1971.
15. See id. at 143.
16. See id. at 66-68.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 67.
19. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.
20. Id. at 61.
21. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
22. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Analysis: The personhood of corporations,SCOTUSBLoc (Jan.
21, 2010, 6:45 PM), http://www.scotusblogcom/2010/01/analysis-the-personhood-of-corporations/.
23. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 318-19. Electioneering communication was defined as "any
broadcast, cable, or satellite communication [that] refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal
office" and ran within thirty days of a primary or sixty days of a general election. 2 U.S.C. § 441b;
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 321.
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the Court.24 The Court rejected Citizens United's contention that the
disclosure laws in question were unconstitutional 25 and held that the
anti-corruption rationale of Buckley only applied to quid pro quo
corruption. 26
That is, "[t]he absence of prearrangement and
coordination" with a candidate alleviates any concern that the
contribution to the candidate will create corruption, and without
evidence that this actually occurred, the anti-corruption rationale cannot
justify a disclosure law. 27 A lengthy and passionate dissent by Justice
Stevens stressed that "[c]orruption can take many forms" and that
Congress has a legitimate
interest in preventing corruption "beyond the
'2
sphere of quid pro quo. 8
In Doe v. Reed, the Court upheld a Washington law that required
disclosure of the names and demographic information of any person
who signed a petition in support of a ballot initiative on the grounds of
maintaining the integrity of the electoral process. 30 In doing so,
however, at least one justice refused to accept the informational interest
set forth by the state. 3 1 To Justice Alito, there were no circumstances
under which the informational interest was sufficient to expose signers
of the petition to possible harassment and threats for exercising their
First Amendment rights to political speech.32 The Court also reaffirmed
its application of exacting scrutiny to disclosure requirements in the
electoral context.33
The Court further limited the reach of Congress in regulating
campaign contributions and disclosure in McCutcheon v. Federal
Elections Commission.34 McCutcheon dealt with a challenge to the
aggregate limits set out in FECA and the Court held that "the
Government's stated objective and the means selected to achieve it" fail
under exacting scrutiny. 35 The plaintiff in McCutcheon contributed up
to the limit, but wanted to contribute beyond it and was prevented from
doing so by FECA.36 He, along with the Republican National

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See generally McConnell v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369.
Id. at 356.
Id.
Id. at 448 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis removed).
561 U.S. 186 (2010).
Id. at 192-93.
Id. at 206 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 196.
McCutcheon v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 134 S.Ct. 1434 (2014).
Id. at 1446.
Id.at 1443.
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Committee, sought constitutional review of the aggregate limits. 37 To
the Court, the lack of a proven connection between aggregate limits and
the important interest of preventing corruption required the law to be
struck down. 38 The case reaffirmed the proposition that Congress may
work to stop quid pro quo corruption and not some sort of undue
influence.39
B. The Tenth And Fifth Circuit Courts ofAppeals Have Reached
Differing Conclusions on the Constitutionalityof Ballot Initiative
DisclosureLaws
1. Sampson v. Buescher
Sampson v. Buescher4° involved a First Amendment challenge to a
Colorado disclosure statute. The Colorado law required any political
committee raising or spending more than $200 in support or opposition
of a ballot initiative to register as an issue committee and report the
names and addresses of any person who donated $20 or more. 41 Before
accepting funds, the committee was required to file a statement of
registration that included the name of the issue committee; the name of a
registered agent; the committee's address and telephone number; the
identities of all affiliated candidates and committees; and the purpose
and nature of the committee.4 2
The law also required political committees to create a separate bank
account and report all contributions and expenditures, the occupation of
anyone who contributed more than $100, the committee's fund balance,
and the name and address of the bank used by the committee.4 3
Organizations that failed to meet these requirements could be fined $50
per day for each day that a past-due report was not filed.44 In addition to
the nineteen pages of rules promulgated by the Secretary of State,
private citizens could enforce the law by filing a complaint with the
Secretary of State alleging violations of the law.4 5
The plaintiffs in Sampson were residents of Parker North and opposed
a ballot initiative that would have annexed their neighborhood to the

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 1444.
Id. at 1451.
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451.
625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1249.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 1-45-108(3) (1997).
Id. §§ 1-45-108(1)(a)(D-(11), (2)(b).
COLO. CONST. art. XXVm, § 10(2)(a).
Id. § 9(2)(a).
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nearby town of Parker, Colorado.46 In opposition to the annexation
proposal, the plaintiffs purchased and distributed signs, mailed postcards
to all residents, and discussed the issue on the Internet.4 7 The plaintiffs
eventually brought suit against the Secretary of State, alleging that the
disclosure laws violated their First Amendment rights to speech,
political expression, and association.4 8
Applying exacting scrutiny, the Tenth Circuit found no justification
for the strict disclosure requirements as applied to the plaintiffs. 49 The
burden on the plaintiffs was found to be substantial-"the average
citizen cannot be expected to master on his or her own the many
campaign financial disclosure requirements" of the state of Colorado.5 °
The Tenth Circuit found that the only interest to be served by the
disclosure laws was an informational interest 51 and that the legislation
failed to sufficiently support that interest. 52 While recognizing that there
is a "legitimate public interest in financial disclosure from campaign
organizations," the court held that "this interest is significantly
attenuated when the organization is concerned with only a single ballot
issue and when the contributions and expenditures are slight., 53 With
this in mind, the court found the burdens placed on the plaintiffs
weighed heavily in favor of declaring the disclosure law
unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs.5 4
2. Justice v. Hosemann
Another case, Justice v. Hosemann,55 dealt with a challenge to
Mississippi's campaign disclosure laws. The plaintiffs in that case
wanted to participate in a ballot initiative campaign in 2011, but were
prevented from doing so because of the state's disclosure and group

46. Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010). The petition to place
annexation on the ballot was initially denied for a lack of signatures. However, in April of 2006, the
original petitioners circulated a second petition, and the issue was placed on the ballot for a February 6,
2007 election. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1253.
49. Id. at 1259.
50. Id.
51. Sampson, 625 F.3d at 1256. Recognized in Buckley, this interest "allows voter to place each

candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party
labels and political speeches. The sources of the candidate's financial support also alert the voter to the

interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitates predictions of future
performance in office. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1975).
52. Sampson, 625 F.3d at 1259.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Justice v. Hosemann, 771 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2014).
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registration laws. 56 The Mississippi statute had specific disclosure
requirements for political committees and individuals that wished to
receive or spend money "in connection with an 'amendment to the
57
Mississippi Constitution proposed by a petition of qualified electors.'
Under the state statute, any person or individual that contributed or spent
more than $200 had to file financial reports with the Mississippi
Secretary of State. 58 After a group registered with the Secretary of
State, it had to file a one-page statement explaining: "the name and
address of the committee; whether it [was] registered with the Federal
Elections Commission or authorized by a candidate; its purpose; the
names of all officers; and its director and treasurer., 59 These political
committees were also required to file monthly reports that disclosed all
contributions and expenditures. Moreover, the contributions to the
committee had to be itemized for any individuals that gave more than
$200 in a month, and also had to include the name and address of the
donor along with the date of the donation.6°
The plaintiffs were five friends that were members of the Young
Americans for Liberty and the Lafayette County Libertarian Party.
They lacked a formal structure or organization, but decided to campaign
together in support of a ballot initiative62 that would have limited the
power of Mississippi to take private property. The plaintiffs contended
that they would have used their collective resources to purchase posters,
buy newspaper ads, and distribute flyers to potential voters on the
issue. 63 The plaintiffs, however, decided not to participate in the
election because of Mississippi's disclosure laws. 64 They sought a
preliminary injunction from the District Court for the Northern District
of Mississippi but it was ultimately denied. However, the plaintiffs
continued their suit after the election. Ultimately, the district court held
that the disclosure requirements impermissibly burdened the plaintiffs'
First Amendment rights and the rights of all groups wishing to raise or
spend just in excess of $200.65

56. Id.at 290.
57. Id. at 287-88. See also Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-17-1 (1993).
58. MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-17-51(1).
59. Hosemann, 771 F.3d at 288.
60. Id.at 289.
61. Id. at 290.
62. The proposed constitutional amendment, Initiative 31, dealt with the eminent domain powers
of the state of Mississippi. The proposal asked whether government should "be prohibited from taking
private property by eminent domain and then transferring it to other persons." Id. at 289.
63. Id. at 290.
64. Hosemann, 771 F.3d at 290.
65. Id. See also Justice v. Hosemann, No. 3:11-CV-138-SASAA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
140666 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 30, 2013).
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After dispensing with the plaintiffs' as-applied challenge 66 to the
statute, 67 the Fifth Circuit considered whether the law was
unconstitutional in all circumstances. 68 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, citing circuit precedent, applied exacting scrutiny 69 to the
disclosure and organizational requirements. Citing Buckley, 7° the Fifth
Circuit identified two interests that generally justify disclosure laws: "an
interest in rooting out corruption and an interest ... in providing the
electorate with information as to where political campaign money comes
from and how it is spent by the candidate in order to aid the voters in
evaluating those who seek federal office." 71 The court then noted that,
while the corruption rationale was not applicable in this case, "the
informational interest ... seems to be at least as strong when it comes to
ballot initiatives." 72 Because ballot initiatives are "numerous, written in
legalese, and subject to the modem penchant for labelling [sic] laws
with terms embodying universally-accepted values," the Fifth Circuit
held that 'd]isclosure laws can provide some clarity amid [the]
murkiness."3 The disclosure information could
give voters a general
74
idea of whether they agreed with the initiative.
The court then turned to the. second inquiry required under the
exacting scrutiny standard. Citing a previous Fifth Circuit case, 75 the
court found that the Mississippi disclosure law did not impermissibly
burden the plaintiffs' expression rights because it did not ask them to do
76
anything other than what a reasonable group would have done anyway.
Specifically, the court presumed that a political issue committee would
66. As-applied challenges are when the plaintiffs in a case believe a law is unconstitutional in
light of their specific circumstances. This differs from a facial challenge, in which plaintiffs claim that a
law is unconstitutional in all factual circumstances.
67. The Fifth Circuit held that, on the record, there was no evidence that the plaintiffs would
have capped their spending at just over $200. Because there was no indication of what kind of remedy
the Fifth Circuit could grant on the as-applied challenge, combined with the lack of certainty that
plaintiffs would not raise more money than $200, the as-applied challenge was dismissed. Hosemann,
771 F.3d at 294-95.
68. Id. at 296.
69. Exacting scrutiny requires courts to determine "whether the government has identified a
'sufficiently important governmental interest' in its disclosure scheme" and whether the disclosure
requirements are substantially related to the purported interest. Id. at 297-99.
70. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
71. Id. at 66-67 (internal quotations omitted).
72. Hosemann, 771 F.3d at 298.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See generally Catholic Leadership Coal. of Tex. v. Reisman, 764 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2014)
(upholding a Texas disclosure law that required general-purpose political committees to appoint a
treasurer before it could receive or spend any funds and fill out a three page registration form before
spending money). Cf MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-17-49(1) (requiring Mississippi political committees to
file a statement of organization within ten days of receipt of or expenditure of over $200).
76. Hosemann, 771 F.3d at 300.
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develop a statement of purpose, identify the president and treasurer, and
keep track of expenditures. 7 The Fifth Circuit did not decide whether
the laws would pass the strict scrutiny standard, because the law passed
the exacting scrutiny standard.7 8

III. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT HAS MISAPPLIED SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT,
UNDERMINED THE PURPOSE OF BALLOT INITIATIVE AND OTHER PUBLIC

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS, AND RESTS ON ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTIONS

Part III of this Casenote will analyze prior Supreme Court precedent
in the area of campaign finance law and conclude that the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals misinterpreted and incorrectly applied this precedent.
Specifically, this Casenote argues that the Fifth Circuit adopted a rule
that hinders fundamental rights and incorrectly applied Supreme Court
precedent in its decision. This Casenote then argues in favor of certain
public policy considerations that undermine the conclusion reached by
the Fifth Circuit. Specifically, this Casenote argues that the Hosemann
decision undermines the original purpose of ballot initiatives. It argues
that the decision wrongfully makes it easier for corporations to
participate in initiative campaigns than an individual. In another
subpart, this Casenote argues that Hosemann inexplicably places a
greater emphasis on a voter's choice of representative than his or her
direct involvement in policy-making. Finally, this Casenote argues that
Hosemann rests on an erroneous assumption, contradicted by empirical
data, that an average voter cannot make a policy decision without
knowing what groups support which side.
A. The Fifth Circuit'sMisapplicationof Supreme CourtPrecedent

The Fifth Circuit incorrectly applied Supreme Court precedent in
making its decision. With little discussion, the court analogized Buckley
and Hosemann, finding an important governmental interest in upholding
a law that restricts political participation in Mississippi. The Fifth
Circuit also incorrectly relied on dicta and a non-analogous line of
decisions to reach its conclusion.

77. Id.
78. Id.
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1. The Compelling Governmental Interests Identified in Buckley Are
Not Applicable to the Ballot Initiative Context, and the Fifth Circuit
Erred in Using This Interest to Justify Its Decision
The Fifth Circuit discussed the two purported governmental interests
set forth by the Supreme Court in Buckley to enforce and uphold
disclosure laws. However, in Hosemann, Mississippi asserted only one
of the two interests from Buckley--"an interest ... in 'provid[ing] the
electorate with information as to where political campaign money comes
from and how it is spent by the candidate in order to aid the voters in
The Fifth Circuit
evaluating those who seek federal office.', 79
acknowledged that its cases recognized the informational interest only in
the context of candidate elections. 80 It then took the drastic step of
extending this logic to the context of initiative elections because "the
informational interest.., seems to be at least as strong when it comes to
ballot initiatives." 81 The Fifth Circuit erred in making this broad and
unsupported statement.
In the context of candidate elections, the application of Supreme
Court precedent is perfectly reasonable-the lower courts are bound by
such precedent. Knowing what kinds of policy groups and political
committees support a candidate can tell a voter what kinds of policyAccordingly, the
making to expect from an elected official.
informational interest is served by requiring a group to disclose who it
supports. Requiring a group to disclose what it supports is an entirely
different matter. The Tenth Circuit in Sampson correctly distinguished
the context of individual campaigns and initiative campaigns.8 2 As the
court pointed out, an initiative campaign does not require the evaluation
of a person's character-it simply involves "whether to approve or
disapprove of discrete governmental action., 83 Nondisclosure and
anonymity in the initiative context "could require debate to actually be
about the merits of the proposition on the ballot" and not allow for
personal attacks on individual or political issue committees that support
or oppose the issue.84 The Tenth Circuit believes it is absurd that states
would pass laws discouraging public discourse and encouraging
dependence upon political committees for information on political
issues, when there is already criticism of a lack of public debate.85
79.
corruption
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 297 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976)). The State conceded that the
rationale from Buckley was not implicated in the case. Id.
Id. at 298.
Hosemann, 771 F.3d at 298.
See Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247, 1256-57 (10th Cir. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 1257.
Id.
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The Tenth Circuit's focus on the informational interest and its
importance in individual campaigns, along with this interest's
inapplicability in the initiative context, makes clear the errors of the
Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit focused on the legal language of
initiatives and the inability of voters to understand this language as a
reason to require disclosure of those who support it. 86 The Tenth Circuit
focused on a voter's ability to debate the merits of an initiative proposal
to the point that he or she can make an informed decision at the ballot
box in striking down the disclosure laws of Colorado. 87 The need to
evaluate a person, and all of his or her qualities and what can affect his
or her decisions in office, justifies disclosure laws because "[c]andidate
elections are, by definition, ad hominem affairs." 88 The identity of
people who contribute large sums of money is necessary information
because it allows voters to anticipate future actions in office. 89
However, initiative campaigns, by definition, are policy-making
decisions. Initiatives do not make decisions in office, nor can they be
influenced by affluent donors. Knowing who has donated to an
initiative-the informational interest approved of by the Fifth Circuit in
Hosemann-is simply inapplicable in the case of initiative campaigns.
As the Tenth Circuit points out, the best way to figure out what an
initiative means is through public debate-not through knowing who
financially supports it.
The Fifth Circuit incorrectly applied Supreme Court precedent in its
decision to uphold the Mississippi disclosure laws.
While the
informational interest from Buckley serves a compelling governmental
interest in the context of candidate campaigns, it is inapplicable in
initiative campaigns. Because the Supreme Court has been silent on
initiative campaign laws, the Fifth Circuit relied on its own erroneous
analogy to apply the informational interest in the initiative campaign
context. There is no precedent to support the Fifth Circuit's holding and
because, as discussed below, the decision limits the constitutional rights
of citizens, Hosemann was incorrectly decided. If anything, Supreme
Court precedent shows a reluctance to extend the informational interest
to the context of ballot initiatives. In Doe v. Reed,90 the Court did not
accept the informational interest asserted by the state of Washington for
its disclosure law, which required the disclosure of demographic
information of any person who signed a petition in support of an

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Hosemann, 771 F.3d at 298.
Sampson, 625 F.3d at 1257.
Id. at 1256.
Id.
561 U.S. 186 (2010).
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initiative. 91 If the Court had accepted the informational purpose, the
state would have run "headfirst into a half-century of our case law,
which firmly establishes that individuals have a right to privacy of belief
and association. 92
Without concise and clear Supreme Court precedent on disclosure
laws in initiative campaigns, the Tenth Circuit took the route of
protecting the privacy and free speech rights of Americans. The Tenth
Circuit correctly acknowledged that the Supreme Court has looked
favorably upon disclosure laws, but that it has never upheld a ballot
initiative disclosure law based on an informational interest asserted by
the government. The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, takes a position
that limits the rights of citizens to participate in the policy-making
mechanisms that occur in their individual states. The Fifth Circuit
should have adopted a view that protected rather than hindered the rights
of individuals to participate in the political process.
B. PublicPolicy ConsiderationsShow that the Fifth Circuit'sDecision
Is Incorrect

The Fifth Circuit's decision in Hosemann was incorrect in light of
Supreme Court precedent. Public policy considerations bolster this
The court's decision, and Mississippi's law itself,
conclusion.
undermine the very purpose of the ballot initiative. The decision also
makes it easier for corporations to participate in an electoral process
designed to bring individuals closer to the political process. The
decision wrongfully places greater importance on an individual's right
to contribute to a representative-who indirectly represents the interests
of his or her constituency-than it does the right to directly affect state
policy. Finally, the Fifth Circuit's decision presumes ignorance of the
electorate and an inability of the voters to read and comprehend the laws
to be voted on.
1. Mississippi's Law and the Fifth Circuit's Decision Upholding It
Undermine the Purpose of Ballot Initiatives
The purpose of a ballot initiative is to bring the electorate and average
citizen closer to the political process by allowing citizens "[to place]
proposed statutes and, in some states, constitutional amendments
[directly] on the ballot," bypassing the state legislature. 93 This purpose
91. Id. at 197.
92. Id.at 207 (Alito, J., concurring).
93. Initiative, Referendum

and Recall, NAT'L CONFERENCE

OF STATE LEGISLATURES,

http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/initiative-referendum-and-recall-overview.aspx
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is especially important in cases where the state legislature refuses to act
on a particular issue. While the specific procedure for ballot initiatives
varies by state,94 the same general process is used in all states which
have adopted the initiative process-a citizen, by gathering a sufficient
number of signatures, can have his or her policy choices placed on the
ballot for a statewide vote.
The initiative process, by allowing citizens to directly participate in
the political process, leads to greater political awareness and
participation. In fact, citizens living in the twenty-four states with ballot
initiatives are more involved in the political process, are more likely to
vote, have more trust in the government, are more aware of political
issues, and have more confidence in the government's ability to respond
to the wishes of the people.9 5 The first ballot initiative was placed on
the ballot in Oregon in the prime of the Progressive movement in the
early 1900s.96 The goal was to shift political power to the people.97 The
leaders of the Progressive movement used this ballot initiative process to
adopt social98 justice reforms state legislatures were reluctant to move
forward on.
While ballot initiatives are no longer the sole province of
Progressives, the state of Mississippi and the Fifth Circuit seem to have
forgotten the beliefs of President Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Jonathan
Bourne, Jr., Governor Hiram Johnson, and the "People's Rule." 99 While
ballot initiatives are designed to bring people closer to the political
process, the Fifth Circuit's decision will block direct participation in the
political process. The Fifth Circuit, in the name of transparency and
educating the public, promotes a single interest-limiting direct
participation in the legislative process. As discussed in the previous
section, the Fifth Circuit incorrectly applied Supreme Court precedent
and set forth unpersuasive reasons for its decision.
Hosemann distorts the purpose of the Progressive movement's ballot
initiative process by discouraging people from participating in the
political process. The Fifth Circuit's focus on educating the public at
large on the specifics of a ballot initiative is admirable, but it sorely
misses the main point of the initiative. The Progressives wanted to
(last visited Nov. 7, 2015).
94. See id.
95. Ballot initiatives, Daniel A. Smith, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ACTIVISM AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

A-D 218 (Gary Anderson & Kathryn Herr, 2007).
96. Id.
97. Id. at217.
98. Id. Examples are "initiatives
on the ballot calling for women's suffrage, the direct primary,
the direct election of U.S. senators, the abolition of the poll tax, home rule for cities and towns, 8-hour
work days for women and minors, and the regulation of public utility and railroad monopolies." Id
99. Id.
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bring the people closer to the political process and push through policy

preferences state legislatures refused to deal with. 100 The marijuana
legalization movement is an example of such a policy issue. Every state
that has legalized the drug to this point has done so through the initiative

process. 10 1 Another example of the effectiveness of the ballot initiative
process involves the legalization of same-sex marriage across the
country. Prior to Obergefell v. Hodges,10 2 state legislatures were
reluctant to approve of same-sex marriage, and the 2012 election cycle
saw three ballot initiatives pass that allowed for gay marriage.10 3 Even
the Chief Justice acknowledged the power of the initiative in creating
the "democratic
momentum" that forced the Court to consider the
1°4
issue.
These two movements epitomize the very purpose of ballot

initiatives. Legislatures dragging their feet must, eventually, answer to

the people, 10 5 who wish to vindicate their own rights and policy
preferences. The ability of citizens to get a government to respond to
the will of the people when it refuses to act-the reason the ballot
initiative was adopted-is impeded by the Mississippi law because it

prevents individuals from campaigning for a political idea and
contributing to the larger societal debate about the issue. Without the

ability to influence government in such a way, the modem political
social movements would have a hard time getting a foothold in the state
legislatures. Marijuana legalization, despite majority support, °6 would

not have gotten off the ground without ballot initiatives. Without ballot
initiatives, the same-sex marriage movement may not have garnered the

100. See, e.g., Julia O'Donoghue, Marijuana legalization should be up to Louisiana voters,
legislator

says,

NOLA.COM

(Mar.

24,

2015,

12:06

AM),

http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/03/marijuana decriminalization sh.html.
Cf Joshua
Miller, State pushes forward to legalize marijuana, BOs. GLOBE (Mar. 23, 2015),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/03/22/lawmakers-mull-marijuanalegalization/golTlLjcXUbSjuBqHyFmaN/story.html.
101. See O'Donoghue, supra note 100.
102. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
103. Gizelle Lugo, Same sex marriage ballot initiatives: voters in strong backingfor equality,
THE GuARDIAN (Nov. 7, 2012, 1:44 PM), http://www.theguardian.com!world/2012/nov/07/same-sexmarriage-ballot-initiatives. These states were Maine, Maryland, and Washington. Minnesota, in the
same election cycle, did not pass an initiative that would have banned same-sex marriage. Id.
104. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2615 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting DeBoer v. Snyder, 772
F.3d 388, 396 (6th Cir. 2014)).
105. In light of Obergefell, state legislators can also be forced to answer to the people by way of
federal court order. While some, like the Chief Justice in his Obergefell dissent, argue that the courts
have no right to interfere in the initiative process, the federal courts seem to be one of the few places
citizens can make themselves heard on issues the legislature will not deal with.
106. Lydia Saad, Majority Continues to Support Pot Legalization in U.S., GALLUP (Nov. 6, 2014),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/l 79195/majority-continues-supprt-pt-egaizatin.aspx.
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support of fifty-nine percent of Americans in 201410 7 -it almost
certainly would not have reached the Supreme Court in 2015. The
ballot initiative is specifically designed to reflect the will of the people
and bring quick changes in public policy.10 8 Limiting participation in a
vital part of American democracy and policy change, as the decision in
Hosemann will do, undermines the very purpose of the initiative
campaign process.
Upholding a law that discourages individuals from participating in the
ballot campaigning process will only limit political participation. There
is evidence that political participation and political knowledge are
already at a higher rate in states with the initiative process.0 9 In fact,
the decision likely will decrease rates for these two factors. Citizens
will be less likely to participate in the political process because of the
amount of time, effort, and money it would require to campaign on a
ballot initiative. One must look no further than the Fifth Circuit's
recitation of facts in Hosemann to see a clear chilling effect of the
Mississippi law. The plaintiffs specifically stated that they did not
participate in campaigning for a particular ballot initiative because of
the administrative and time costs required by the Mississippi law.' 10
The chilling effect of the Fifth Circuit's decision does not further any
governmental interest. It acts only to bottle up debate on political
issues. Clearly, the plaintiffs in Hosemann felt the eminent domain
ballot initiative was important enough to campaign for. They were
prevented from expressing their political ideas because of an overly
burdensome law that, in practice, undermines the very electoral
procedure it was designed to make more transparent. Based on the
underlying principles of the First Amendment and the original purpose
of the ballot initiative, the Fifth Circuit was wrong in limiting political
participation and the dissemination of debate and ideas.
The
Progressives of the 1900s would be shocked to see a state government,
in the name of transparency, limit political expression and direct
participation.

107. Peyton M. Craighill & Scott Clement, Supportfor same-sex marriagehits new high; halfsay
Constitution
guarantees
right,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
5,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/support-for-same-sex-marriage-hits-new-high-half-sayconstitution-guarantees-right/2014/03/04/f737e87e-a3e5-1 1e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c-story.html.
108. See id. Only thirty-eight percent of Americans believed same-sex marriage should be legal
in 2004, but that number jumped to fifty percent in 2014. Id. This increase of support is mirrored in the
passage of three ballot initiatives in 2012. Id.
109. Justice v. Hosemann, 771 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2014).
110. Id. at290.
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2. The Fifth Circuit Wrongfully Made It Easier for a Corporation to
Campaign for a Ballot Initiative than the Average Voter-the Very
People the Initiative Process Was Designed to Help
As discussed, the ballot initiative was developed to bring the people
closer to the political process. Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit's
decision makes it easier for corporations to influence ballot initiatives
while simultaneously inhibiting the ability of individuals to affect the
political process. The court's decision, again, leads to consequences
that undermine the purpose of ballot initiatives and direct democracy. In
the context discussed below, the Fifth Circuit encourages corporationswith their superior manpower, organization, and resources-to expend
more influence in an initiative election than the average citizen-the
very type of person an initiative election was designed to get more
involved in politics.
With much controversy and passionate dissent, the Supreme Court
has already extended many of the civil rights of citizens to
corporations.1 11 The Fifth Circuit continues this trend by granting
corporations greater influence in initiative processes than the average
citizen. No matter the merits of these decisions, there seems little policy
or legal support for granting corporations an easier time than individuals
to comply with disclosure requirements. The Mississippi disclosure
requirements burden individuals in a way that will not affect
corporations. The requirements for creating and maintaining a group to
campaign for a ballot initiative in Mississippi u 2 are burdensome to busy
individuals, but easily manageable for a corporation desiring to
influence voters.
It is burdensome for an individual to fill out the Statement of Purpose,
keep track of the political committee's expenditures on an itemized and
monthly basis, and report his or her own expenditures in a monthly
report. It takes time and effort that could be spent better elsewheresuch as spending time with family, participating in public forums, or
volunteering in the community. For a corporation, it would be
exceedingly easy for a low level employee to fill out these reports
111. See generally, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (extending the definition of "person" under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act to include for-profit corporations and granting them religious rights
under RFRA).
112. Under Mississippi law, a group that raises or spends more than $200 on an initiative
campaign must file financial reports with the Secretary of State. Hosemnann, 771 F.3d at 288. When a
group registers, it must file a Statement of Organization listing the name and address of the committee;
whether it is registered by the FEC or authorized by a candidate; the committee's purpose; the names of
all officers; and its director and treasurer. Id. at 288-89. The committees must also file monthly
itemized reports detailing all donors' names, addresses, and the dates of the donation. Id. at 289.
Finally, individuals themselves must report on a monthly basis any contributions over $200. Id.
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without impeding the function and business of a corporation that has
formed its own political committee. The corporation is, simply put,
unaffected by the disclosure requirements because of the ease with
which a lower member of the corporate entity can comply with the
disclosure requirements.
Moreover, an average citizen must balance these monthly
requirements with the other challenges of life. One must only consider
the following question: is it more burdensome for a secretary at the
corporate office of Hobby Lobby to maintain financial records and
expenditure reports on a monthly basis than it is for a working member
of a family with multiple children? The ease of this answer shows the
error in the Fifth Circuit's decision. By upholding the Mississippi
disclosure requirements, the Fifth Circuit removed initiative power from
the people-burdened by the disclosure and reporting requirementsand gave it to corporations-which can easily comply with the reporting
requirements. Simply put, the Fifth Circuit gave corporations more
rights than the average citizen working with friends to create a political
issue committee.
3. A Citizen's Right to Campaign for Changes to His or Her Own
State's Law Should Not Be Viewed as Less Important than a Citizen's
Right to Campaign for a Particular Candidate
Without much discussion, both the Fifth and Tenth Circuits found
that reporting and disclosure requirements in the context of ballot
initiatives were subject to only exacting scrutiny, a lesser form of
scrutiny than that applied to laws restricting donations to individual
candidates. It is unclear why a citizen's right to participate in direct
democracy, free from burdens imposed by the state, is less important to
these courts than the right of a person to donate to individual candidates.
This position is counterintuitive. Donating to an individual politician is
not a contribution made in support of a policy decision. It will not have
a direct effect on the laws of an individual state. This much is clear, as
elected candidates have no obligation to directly follow the wishes of
their constituents. Laws restricting donations to these individuals, who
do not directly represent voters, are subject to the highest level of
scrutiny.
To the contrary, laws that burden the direct involvement and
influence on state policy are subject to a lesser form of scrutiny, giving
the government more leeway in limiting political expression. It is
unclear why burdens on direct influence of state policy receive more
deference than indirect influence on individuals with no obligation to
follow the will of voters. The purpose of the ballot initiative is to
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encourage direct political participation on issues upon which legislatures
refuse to act. Why, one has to wonder, is participating in this process
less important than simply writing a check to a senate campaign? The
difference in application of scrutiny testing levels seems like an arbitrary
decision that places one fundamental right on a different level of
importance than another. The Supreme Court already has required the
government to show a compelling interest before a law can limit how
much money someone gives to a candidate. It would not be an outlier to
require the showing of a compelling interest before allowing a law that
hindered direct participation in democracy.
This lack of strict scrutiny in the context of initiatives, discussed
further in Part IV, undermines the very purpose of the initiative process
by allowing state governments to chill participation in the adoption of
statewide policy. There is not a policy rationale that justifies the use of
strict scrutiny in cases of disclosure requirements in individual
campaigns but a lesser standard for ballot initiatives.
4. In Hosemann, the Fifth Circuit Refused to Put Faith in the
Intelligence of Average Voters and Their Ability to Educate
Themselves. Empirical Data Shows There is a Connection Between
Ballot Initiatives and Increased Voter Awareness.
The Fifth Circuit's decision takes a paternalistic view. It also calls
into doubt the ability of the electorate to educate itself on complex
political issues. Blaming a "modern penchant for labelling [sic] laws
with terms embodying universally-accepted values" and initiatives
"written in legalese," the Fifth Circuit holds itself out as superior to the
average voter. 113 The court further bolsters its position that a voter is
unable to make his or her own decision freely, stating that "[c]itizens
rely ever more on a message's
source as a proxy for reliability and a
'1 14
barometer of political spin."
The position that a voter cannot read and understand a ballot initiative
on his or her own without knowing what group has supported or
opposed it is one that should be insulting to voters. While the
informational interest may be advanced in the context of individual
candidates, 15 the interest can be advanced in the initiative context only
under the assumption that a voter cannot understand the words in front

113. Id. at 298.
114. Hosemann, 771 F.3d at 298 (quoting Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 57 (1st
Cir. 2011)).
115. Politicians, after all, have always been thought of as less than transparent on their views.
Knowing who supports a candidate provides guidance to voters on people that are, simply put, difficult
to read and understand.
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of him or her. This assumption should be shocking to the average voter.
It should be insulting to the voters living in the Fifth Circuit that its
Court of Appeals based a decision entirely on an assumption that they
cannot read and understand the complex legal words before them or
become politically aware through public debate. The Fifth Circuit
should have encouraged robust public debate on the initiatives rather
than simply assuming that citizens could not speak about or understand
legal and policy issues that affect the state.
In addition, empirical evidence contradicts this assumption and shows
that participation in ballot initiative campaigns should actually be
encouraged. Using data from the 2002 midterm elections, 116 at least one
researcher found that ballot initiatives increase voter interest and voter
awareness. 117 In addition, the same researcher suggested that "ballot
measures provide alternative sources of information about politics that
make democracy possible" as well as "emotional content" in a way
similar to newspapers, TV, and radio. 118 Specifically, political interest
and awareness increased with the number of ballot initiatives up for a
vote. 119 This increased interest, in turn, led to higher participation and
voter turnout. 120 In light of this empirical data, the Fifth Circuit's
decision seems all the more incorrect. Voters are actually more aware
as a result of ballot initiatives, and this awareness increases as the
number of initiatives increases in a state.1 2 1 In another study, different
researchers reached a similar conclusion. 122 The authors acknowledged
that there was a distinct correlation between states with ballot initiatives
and more civic engagement, higher voter turnout, and greater political
awareness. 123 The decision in Hosemann to limit participation in the
initiative process, therefore, may actually end up hurting political
awareness and interest. Although it has not been proven that there is a
causal link between participation in ballot initiatives and political
awareness, researchers have found, at the least, a correlation. There is
no reason to limit participation in initiative campaigns when initiative
116. Caroline Tolbert, The Ballot Measure/Citizen Interest Link: Information, Engagement and
Participation 6 (Jan. 14-15, 2000) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at the Symposium on the Impact
of Direct Democracy), http://www.nonprofitvote.org/documents/2010/11/ballot-measure-and-citizeninterest-in-2005.pdf. Tolbert used the 2002 Pew Internet and American Life Daily Tracking Survey and
the 2002 American National Election Student as the foundation for her paper.
117. Id. at25.
118. Id.
119. Id. at21.
120. Id.
121. Tolbert, supranote 116, at21.
122. Todd Rogers & Joel A. Middleton, Are ballot initiative outcomes influenced by the
campaigns of independent groups? A Precinct-RandomizedFieldExperiment Showing That They Are,
37 POL. BEHAVIOR 567, 568 (2014).
123. Id.
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campaigns have been shown to increase knowledge. Because initiatives
increase political participation and awareness on their own, without the
help of disclosure requirements, the informational interest stressed by
the court in Hosemann rings empty.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Hosemann rests on an assumption that
the average voter needs help in interpreting and understanding ballot
initiative issues, and that requiring disclosure of expenditures on
initiatives is a way to help voters make up their minds. The Fifth
Circuit's decision also ignores empirical data that the existence of the
ballot initiative encourages voter turnout and participation, and that the
existence of a strong initiative campaign increases voter knowledge and
interest in state politics. Because of this assumption and data to the
contrary, the Fifth Circuit's decision is incorrect.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED CERTIORARI IN
HOSEMANN AND USED STRICT SCRUTINY TO REVIEW Mississippi's
BALLOT INITIATIVE DISCLOSURE LAW

On April 4, 2016, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' petition
for a writ of certiorari in Hosemann.124 In doing so, the Court missed an
opportunity to resolve a circuit split that will continue to deprive citizens
of the Fifth Circuit of their rights to participate in the ballot initiative
process. Moving forward, should any other Circuit Courts of Appeals
face a law similar to the one in Hosemann, these sister circuits should
adopt the view taken by the Tenth Circuit in Sampson.
However, a simple adoption of the Tenth Circuit's view will not go
far enough. While reaching the correct outcome in Sampson and
dutifully applying Supreme Court precedent, the Tenth Circuit should
have applied strict scrutiny rather than exacting scrutiny. Obviously,
this court cannot overrule Supreme Court precedent. That being said,
Hosemann was an opportunity for the Supreme, Court to protect the
rights of citizens to the fullest extent possible-a step it has been
unwilling to take in the context of ballot initiative campaigns. By
adopting the Sampson rationale, other Courts of Appeals will force the
Supreme Court to again consider a writ of certiorari, as the circuit split
will continue to deepen.
While Sampson is a step in the right direction, it simply does not go
far enough in protecting the rights of individuals to engage in political
speech. The role of the courts is to protect citizens from overreaching
laws that abridge the freedom of speech-the Supreme Court should,
can, and must go further than the Tenth Circuit did in its decision. An
124. Justice v. Hosemann, No. 15-682, 2016 WL 1278657 (U.S. Apr. 4, 2016).
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application of strict scrutiny to disclosure laws in the ballot initiative
context would not necessarily condemn these laws to findings of
unconstitutionality. If, for example, a law required disclosure with
fewer hoops to jump through than the Mississippi law, it would be more
permissible for the court to uphold the law. Under such a scheme, the
interests of the state and the citizens would be balanced. The state
would be able to further its compelling interest in keeping track of
where money is being spent in politics, and individuals would be able to
participate in the political process with fewer burdens. If a state were to
relax its regulations on disclosures in initiative campaigns, it would
strike the perfect balance. It may also pass, in the eyes of a court, strict
judicial scrutiny.
Because the Supreme Court refused to take the case and resolve the
circuit split, the states themselves can and should alter their own laws to
strike a balance between the states' interest in keeping track of
campaign expenditures and the rights of the people to participate in the
political process. A state could, for example, raise the amount of
expenditures required before a committee must register; roll back the
strict monthly reporting requirements when the committee is run by
individuals rather than a corporation; or simply articulate, in the law, the
interest the legislatures are attempting to further through the law. While
it is unclear how a court would rule on a different set of facts from
Hosemann or Sampson, the states could act as laboratories for reform
and test the limits of how few--or, in the case of Mississippi, how
many-regulations the state can impose upon an individual in an
initiative campaign. If the judicial system refuses to step in and protect
the rights of citizens to participate in initiative campaigns, the states
should move to protect this right by deregulating and rolling back any
strict disclosure requirements as applied to individuals wishing to form a
political issue committee.
V. CONCLUSION

The Fifth Circuit incorrectly upheld Mississippi's initiative disclosure
laws because its decision takes a step towards limiting political
participation by individuals and undermines the original reason for the
ballot initiative-bringing citizens closer to the political process. The
Supreme Court has been silent on the issue of initiative campaign
disclosure laws, and the Fifth Circuit, as is its right, selected a test it saw
fit. However, it selected the rule that restricts political speech and
makes it more difficult for citizens to become involved in policymaking. It incorrectly analogized initiative campaigns to individual
campaigns and failed to sufficiently explain its analogy-because its
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analogy rested on the assumption that the average American voter is
unable to read and comprehend legal language. The decision also makes
it easier for corporations to participate than people in the initiative
process and, without explanation, places the right of a citizen to directly
influence state policy at a lower level of importance than a citizen's
right to select a representative.
The Supreme Court should have reviewed Hosemann and reversed
the Fifth Circuit. By rejecting review, the Supreme Court missed an
opportunity to adopt the strict scrutiny test for all laws that restrict the
ability of a person to participate in a ballot initiative campaign. In both
Sampson and Hosemann, the Courts of Appeals did not fulfill its duty to
protect the rights of American citizens to speak freely and participate
directly in the political process.
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